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FOREWORD Imagine an i n d i v i d u a l somewhere i n A f r i c a faced w i t h t h e problem o f f i n a n c i n g a major purchase. There are t h e f o l l o w i n g options. F i r s t i s t o open a savings account i n t h e l o c a l bank. The person could make r e g u l a r deposits and accumulate i n t e r e s t u n t i l he o r she has enough funds t o acquire t h e p a r t i c u l a r good i n question. The second o p t i o n i s t o take out a loan w i t h t h e bank. The good could then be purchased immediately, and t h e l o a n p l u s i n t e r e s t would be r e p a i d over time. The t h i r d o p t i o n i s t o j o i n a r o t a t i n g savings and c r e d i t association (ROSCA) i n t h e v i 11 age. I n t h i s working paper, van den B r i n k and Chavas come t o t h e r a t h e r s u r p r i s i n g concl u s i on t h a t , given c e r t a i n condi t i ons, t h e average i n d i v i d u a l would deem t h e ROSCA a more e f f i c i e n t i n s t i t u t i o n t o achieve h i s o r her goal than t h e bank.
I n an era o f s t r u c t u r a l adjustment i n which many policymakers are advocating t h e disengagement o f t h e s t a t e from t h e economy, t h i s f i n d i n g i s o f considerable importance. I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e neoclassical c r i t i q u e o f t h e r o l e o f t h e s t a t e i s based on t h e premise t h a t p r i v a t e s e c t o r i n s t i t u t i o n s w i 1 l f o s t e r t h e development o f competitive markets. This c r i t i q u e , however, has been r e c e n t l y challenged by those who argue t h a t market f a i l u r e s and r e n t s associated w i t h indigenous market i n s t i t u t i o n s make any development pol i c y predicated on r a d i c a l s t a t e d i sengagement a p e r i l o u s path t o f o l l o w . Therefore, i n order t o begin t o c l a r i f y t h e arguments on t h e proper r o l e o f t h e state, and t h e capacity o f p r i v a t e sector i n s t i t u t i o n s t o operate i n an u n f e t t e r e d manner t o promote economic development, i t i s o f paramount importance t o examine t h e issue o f whether indigenous economic i n s t i t u t i o n s are e f f i c i e n t and equitable
, and under what circumstances they serve as t h e basis f o r promoting sustainable growth.
Given t h e v i t a l r o l e t h a t c r e d i t plays i n a g r i c u l t u r a l development, and t h e we1 l-documented f a i l u r e o f many formal c r e d i t programs, t h i s a n a l y s i s provides a good example o f t h e capacity o f informal i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s . The p o l i c y lessons t o be learned from t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e ROSCA a r e n o t d i r e c t , however. The authors c o r r e c t l y p o i n t o u t t h a t l o c a l , indigenous i n s t i t u t i o n s have no a p r i o r i s u p e r i o r c l a i m t o e f f i c i e n c y . Nonetheless, t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e ROSCA provides many lessons o f d i r e c t relevance t o t h e design o f appropriate c r e d i t technology.
I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e study admonish caution before any more undue experimentation w i t h t h e implementation o f Western i n s t i t u t i o n a l designs i s undertaken, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h t h e backing o r under t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e s t a t e and without a f u l l e r understanding of indigenous i n s t i t u t i o n s . Consequently, t h e paper c o n s t i t u t e s a valuable c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e "new" theory o f economic i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n t h i s emerging body o f 1 i t e r a t u r e , i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e seen as a r a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem o f minimizing t h e costs o f economic t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h i n a context o f u n c e r t a i n t y and imperfect information.
INTRODUCTION
During t h e 1970s t h e economies of many sub-Saharan c o u n t r i e s t y p i c a l 1 y experienced a1 1 o r p a r t o f t h e f o l 1 owing: rampant i n f l a t i on, overval ued currencies, f a l l i n g r e a l producer prices, plummeting exports, shortages o f f o r e i g n exchange, and shortages o f consumer goods. An economic c r i s i s ensued i n t h e 1980s.
However, t h e c r i s i s was mostly a c r i s i s o f t h e market economy associated w i t h f o r m a l l y organized economic i n s t i t u t i o n s , as i t appears i n t h e n a t i o n a l accounts o f t h e various c o u n t r i e s . I t i s n o t c l e a r whether l e s s formal economic i n s t i t u t i o n s a l s o went through a c r i s i s d u r i n g t h i s period. It i s now w i d e l y acknowledged t h a t informal i n s t i t u t i o n s p l a y an important r o l e i n t h e a1 1 o c a t i on of product, 1 abor, 1 and, and c a p i t a l i n most devel opi ng c o u n t r i e s . Moreover, t h e r e i s some evidence t h a t t h e informal s e c t o r o f t h e economy may have a c t u a l l y r i s e n i n importance d u r i n g t h e c r i s i s years, thus preventing a sharp d e c l i n e i n t h e standard o f 1 i v i n g (Sahn and S a r r i s 1991). Unfortunately, because many a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e i n f o r m a l s e c t o r f a i l t o be captured i n n a t i o n a l accounts, our c u r r e n t understanding o f t h i s s e c t o r i s r a t h e r rudimentary. As a r e s u l t , t h e r o l e o f i n f o r m a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n economic development c l e a r l y needs t o be r e f i n e d .
This would be p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i f t h e i n f o r m a l s e c t o r can help compensate f o r some o f t h e f a i l u r e s o f t h e formal sector. This paper focuses on i n f o r m a l c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s i n sub-Saharan ~f r i c a . ' A t t h i s time, t h e performance o f such i n s t i t u t i o n s i s n o t w e l l understood. A f a i r l y common view among microeconomists seems t o be t h a t informal c r e d i t markets are n o t competitive.
On t h e o t h e r hand, among macroeconomists, they are sometimes assumed t o be p e r f e c t l y competitive and v i r t u a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from a standard neoclassical "bond" market ((e.g., Van Wijnbergen 1983; Fry 1988;  Owen and So1 i s-Fa1 1 as 1989).
A1 leged imperfections -market f a i 1 ures -have o f t e n provided t h e j u s t i f i c at i o n f o r formal government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n c r e d i t markets. Unfortunately, i t seems f a i r t o conclude t h a t t h e numerous attempts t o r e p a i r c r e d i t market f a i l u r e s by government i n t e r v e n t i o n have o f t e n l e d t o government f a i l u r e s . I t has been argued t h a t such f a i l u r e s -market and government a1 i ke -a r e t h e r e s u l t o f i n f o r m a t i o n a l problems i n t h e context o f economic u n c e r t a i n t y ( S t i g l i t z 1989). However, t h e syndrome o f "mu1 t i p 1 e market f a i 1 ures" i s as d i f f i c u l t t o i n t e r p r e t f o r t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s as are t h e n o t i o n s o f p e r f e c t competition and complete information.
I n l i g h t o f c u r r e n t knowledge and t h e ambiguity o f formal t h e o r y w i t h respect t o p o l i c y formulation, more a n a l y s i s on t h e performance o f i n f o r m a l For a general i n t r o d u c t i o n t o r u r a l c r e d i t markets i n developing countries, see von Pi sch ke e t a1 . (1983) .
c r e d i t markets i s needed.
The o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s paper i s t o analyze from a microeconomic perspective a p a r t i c u l a r v a r i a n t o f f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a t i o n which i s found throughout t h e world. The n j m g e h , as i t i s known i n t h e G r a s s f i e l d s o f Cameroon, i s a member o f a worldwide f a m i l y o f indigenous savings and c r e d i t clubs t h a t have been named r o t a t i n g savings and c r e d i t associations, o r ROSCAs (Bouman 1977; I l l y 1973) .
The ROSCA i s a widespread phenomenon i n t h e r u r a l and urban economies o f much o f sub-Saharan A f r i c a (e.g., Ardener 1953 and 1964; Geertz 1962; Miracle, Miracle, and Cohen 1980; and Nweze 1990 ). It i s r a t h e r amazing t h a t i t has received very l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n from economist^.^ This l a c k o f a t t e n t i o n i s somewhat s u r p r i s i n g , given t h e prominent r o l e o f another i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e on economic development and c r e d i t markets: t h e s t e r e o t y p i c a l Asian 1 and1 ord-cum-money1 ender (e.g., Bhaduri 1973; Basu 1984 ; and H a r t 1986).
The o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h i s paper i s as follows. F i r s t , t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of t h e njangeh as a p a r t i c u l a r type o f r o t a t i n g savings and c r e d i t a s s o c i a t i o n i s presented. Second, a model i s developed i n an attempt t o r e f i n e t h e m i croeconomi c foundations o f ROSCAs. Thi rd, some empi ri c a l evidence wi 11 be examined from ROSCAs i n Cameroon. The a n a l y s i s presented i s based on f i e l d w o r k undertaken over a s i x-month p e r i o d i n 1979/1980 i n a v i 1 1 age i n Cameroon named B i g ~a b a n k i .~'~ I n t h e analysis, t h e f o l l o w i n g questions w i l l be i n v e s t i g a t e d : 'To what economic problem does t h e ROSCA p r o v i d e an i n s t i t u t i o n a l answer?" and H o w e f f i c i e n t i s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n compared w i t h o t h e r forms o f f i n a n c i a l mediation?" F i n a l l y , a number o f p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e suggested.
The ROSCA i s known as t o n t i n e i n Francophone West A f r i c a , dashi among t h e Nupe i n N i g e r i a , i s u s u among t h e I b o and Yoruba, and as susu i n Ghana. It i s c a l l e d ekub i n E t h i o p i a . I n Tanzania, i t i s c a l l e d upatu, whereas i t i s known as chilemba i n many o t h e r p a r t s o f East A f r i c a . I n o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e world, t h e ROSCA i s c a l l e d o r i s o n (Indonesia), pis huey (Thai1 and), ko (Japan), ho (Vietnam), kye (Korea), and h u i (Central China).
For a noteworthy exception, see Besley, Coate, and Loury (1990) . ' B i g Babanki i s a small chiefdom i n t h e North West Province, 30 kilometers n o r t h o f Bamenda, t h e p r o v i n c i a l c a p i t a l . It 1 i e s i n t h e h i l l y , savannah r e g i o n known as t h e G r a s s f i e l d s o f West Cameroon. Coffee i s t h e main cash crop f o r men, whi 1 e t h e production and marketing o f food crops, dominated by women, was r a p i d l y becoming an important s e c t o r o f t h e economy.
Some o f t h e data c o l l e c t e d were p a r t o f a r e p l i c a t i o n e f f o r t o f an e a r l i e r survey conducted i n 1970 and pub1 ished i n Bouman and Harteveld (1976) . The same questionnaire was used again i n 1979 t o i n t e r v i e w a sample o f 46 members i n t h e same ROSCAs -i f these were s t i 11 f u n c t i o n a l . Some comparisons between t h e two p o i n t s i n t i m e could be made w i t h respect t o t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e ROSCAs i n a changing economic environment. The survey information provided a case study f o r t h e e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f ROSCAs (van den B r i n k 1980).
WHAT IS A ROSCA?
The ROSCA i s an a s s o c i a t i o n o f men and/or women t h a t meets a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s , f o r instance once a month, and d i s t r i b u t e s a lump sum o f money t o one o f i t s members. The fund i s made up o f t h e v a r i a b l e o r f i x e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f each member o f t h e association. It i s , i n turn, given as a whole t o each member o f t h e association. For instance, t e n 'individuals meet every month and each pays 10 do1 1 a r s i n t o a pool. Thus, each month t h e r e i s 100 do1 l a r s i n t h e pool . This i s then handed over t o one o f t h e members. I n t h e next month they again pay 10 d o l l a r s each and a d i f f e r e n t member o f t h e group receives t h e money, and so on u n t i l every member has had h i s o r her t u r n .
This i s t h e basic s t r u c t u r e o f r o t a t i n g savings and c r e d i t associations. No i n t e r e s t c a l c u l a t i o n s are made.
However, t h e ROSCA as i t can be found i n t h e G r a s s f i e l d s o f Cameroon i s c l o s e l y associated w i t h a second economic i n s t i t u t i o n operating i n para1 l e l , which does charge i n t e r e s t on i t s transactions. It i s c a l l e d t h e meeting, o r trouble bank.6 The t r o u b l e bank operates w i t h i n t h e ROSCA and can be described as a terminating fixed fund a s~o c i a t i o n .~ It i s b a s i c a l l y a small bank from which t h e members can borrow a t a f i x e d i n t e r e s t r a t e . A l l members, aside from t h e i r v a r i a b l e o r f i x e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e ROSCA, a l s o subscribe t o t h i s o t h e r fund. The accumulated fund i s used t o g i v e loans t o members o f t h e a s s o c i a t i o n a t an i n t e r e s t r a t e o f 50 CFAF per month p e r 1,000 CFAF, i .e., 5 percent per month on t h e p r i n c i p a l , which imp1 i e s an annual i n t e r e s t r a t e o f 60 percent. I n t h e t r o u b l e bank, a c r e d i t c e i l i n g e x i s t s r e l a t e d t o t h e average s u b s c r i p t i o n . Members can take several loans d u r i n g a cycle, provided o l d debts a r e s e t t l e d f i r s t . The s u b s c r i p t i o n s are u s u a l l y f i x e d a t a c e r t a i n l e v e l , although t h e f i r s t c o n t r i b u t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y h i g h e r than t h e r e g u l a r s u b s c r i p t i o n s i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h a sizeable i n i t i a l fund f o r loans.
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Although t h e people o f t h e v i l l a g e r o u t i n e l y use t h e word "meeting," I w i l l replace i t by " t r o u b l e bank" t o avoid confusion.
I n South A f r i c a these associations are c a l l ed s t o k f e l s . El sewhere, they are a1 so known as "Christmas clubs," since, as was t h e case i n Cameroon, these t r o u b l e banks are o f t e n 1 i quidated i n December.
Fixed fund associations, such as t h e meeting o r t r o u b l e bank, are a l s o f r e q u e n t l y used o u t s i d e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l context o f t h e ROSCA. For instance, t h e l o c a l branch o f t h e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l party, uses a f i x e d fund a s s o c i a t i o n t o d i s t r i b u t e p a r t y membership cards, obl i g a t o r y f o r every Cameroonian c i t i z e n . Fixed fund associations are a1 so used by t a x c o l l e c t o r s . Most popular, however, are t h e associations among women: membership may e a s i l y reach 50 t o 100 persons.
A f t e r completion of a f u l l ROSCA cycle, t h e t r o u b l e bank i s a l so terminated. The members r e c e i v e back t h e i r accumulated savings p l u s an equal share o f the c o l l e c t e d i n t e r e s t s . Out o f t h e t o t a l sum o f i n t e r e s t payments c o l l e c t e d , the secretary, banker, and a s s i s t a n t are paid t h e i r fees. As w i t h any o t h e r bank, i n t e r e s t payments cover dividends and overhead costs. I n t e r e s t on savings might be about 15 t o 25 percent p e r year, since n o t a1 1 savings are mobi 1 i z e d f o r c r e d i t purposes. Because borrowers a l s o receive t h e i r share o f dividends a t t h e end o f t h e cycle, they t y p i c a l l y borrow against an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r e s t r a t e ( i n t e r e s t p a i d o n 1 oans minus dividends received a t t h e end o f the cycle) o f 25 t o 30 percent.
W e s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h e r e l a t i o n between t r o u b l e bank and t h e ROSCA a t a l a t e r p o i n t . The president can impose a number o f f i n e s i n order t o enforce t h e r u l e s o f t h e ROSCA. Tardiness, making "palaver" a t important moments i n t h e proceedings, and any i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n payments are a l l l i a b l e t o immediate f i n e s . The accumulated f i n e s a r e kept by a banker and a r e u s u a l l y a l l o c a t e d t o the l a n d l o r d a t t h e end o f t h e cycle.
Such data are e a s i l y obtained from t h e njangeh records kept by t h e secretary.
'' One should n o t associate t h i s w i t h t h e Asian stereotype. The term landlord i s simply used t o i d e n t i f y t h e president o f t h e a s s o c i a t i o n and t h e one who owns t h e compound where t h e meetings o f t h e njangeh are held.
The existence o f w r i t t e n records on t h e operations o f t h e ROSCA and t h e
MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
If we examine the ROSCA system more closely, we realize t h a t a l l members of the group (apart from the one who receives the money l a s t ) receive an advance t h a t they repay through t h e i r contributions during the cycle. The f i r s t member t o c o l l e c t the monthly fund -rank one in the order of rotation -receives the maximum c r e d i t t h a t he or she pays back in monthly instal lments during the cycle, The l a s t member -say, rank N -receives no c r e d i t and saves throughout the cycle, while recovering his or her savings a t the end. Thus, c r e d i t C i s reduced in the same measure as the cycle progresses, according t o the formula below. For an individual with rank j , we can calculate the "net" c r e d i t o r loan 1 as follows:
where: N = number of members, i .e., t o t a l number of times the fund i s allocated; c = fixed periodical contribution per member; j = rank of recipient of fund in order of rotation ( i .e., number of times fund has been a1 1 ocated previously) ; Cj = c r e d i t extended t o recipient of fund; and 5. = savings made u p t o period j.
In general, then, net c r e d i t L i s unequally distributed over the members, depending on t h e i r rank in the order of the fund's rotation. The f i r s t half of the membership will have a positive 1 value, whereas the l a t t e r half will have a negative L value. Thus, the f i r s t half of the membership are "net creditors,'' and the l a s t half are "net savers."
Interest i s not charged with respect t o the rotation order of the fund. In the Cameroon village studied here, the order of rotation was fixed in advance, and the f i r s t person in the cycle received an i n t e r e s t -f r e e loan t h a t he or she then paid back i n monthly installments. The l a s t person saved throughout the cycle and received h i s accumulated savings a t the end of i t , b u t without any compensation in the form of i n t e r e s t . Several types of i n t e r e s t mechanisms may be found el sewhere, one of which consists of auctioning the fund t o the highest bidder (e.g . , Penny 1968) .
How and why d i d t h e people i n t h e v i l l a g e t h i n k t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f ROSCA evolved? What i s t h e economic r a t i o n a l e behind t h i s scheme? One s t o r y on t h e o r i g i n o f njangeh:
Njangeh was a t h i n g invented by a f a t h e r t o h e l p h i s sons. Imagine he had t h r e e sons and he wanted them t o have wives.
How would he g e t each o f them h i s b r i d e p r i c e ? He would urge h i s sons t o work hard: d i g stones, heat them and make cutlasses and o t h e r t h i n g s . The f a t h e r saved t h e money thus earned, and when he had enough money he gave i t t o t h e o l d e s t son so t h a t he could marry. This one could now s t a r t a f a m i l y b u t would continue working so t h a t e v e n t u a l l y t h e second b r o t h e r could buy a w i f e . And so on.
I n t h i s way everybody c o u l d r a i s e t h e b r i d e p r i c e , because one man would have t h e others working f o r him i f i t was h i s time t o marry. The f a t h e r would be a proud man i f none o f h i s sons were l a z y and worked hard t o he1 p h i s brothers. I n t h e above example, t h e expected w a i t i n g p e r i o d f o r t h e "average" son became s t r i c t l y shorter.
Whether t h e marriage s t o r y i s a c t u a l l y t r u e i s n o t important.I2 However, t h e s t o r y does c o n t a i n t h e c r u c i a l themes t h a t can h e l p us understand t o which s p e c i f i c economic problem t h e r o t a t i n g savings and c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n was a s o l u t i o n . The f i r s t theme i s r e l a t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t h r e e b r o t h e r s a l l needed t o accomplish a goal t h a t r e q u i r e d a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e amount o f cash o r l a b o r . The r a i s i n g o f a b r i d e p r i c e , b u t a1 so t h e b u i l d i n g o f a house o r t h e c l e a r i n g o f a f i e l d , a r e examples o f such goals. This problem i s a v a r i a t i o n on t h e economic problem o f i n d i v i s i b l e goods. I n d i v i d u a l preferences f o r c e r t a i n i n d i v i s i b l e goods w i t h i n a context o f h i g h marginal u t i l i t y f o r
The c r e a t i o n o f t h e " r o t a t i n g b r i d e p r i c e a s s o c i a t i o n " i s Pareto-superior. The f a c t t h a t t h e t h r e e b r o t h e r s had d i f f e r e n t temporal preferences f o r t h e i n d i v i s i b l e good ( i .e., marriage) made an even stronger argument t o c r e a t e a ROSCA. I n t h e above b r i d e p r i c e case, then, t h e 1 umpi ness probl em created an i ntertemporal c o n t r a c t i n g o p p o r t u n i t y .
The above discussion sheds some l i g h t on t h e r a t i o n a l e o f ROSCA. It a l s o r a i s e s several important questions. F i r s t l y , what i f o t h e r a1 t e r n a t i v e s a r e open t o t h e brothers, besides i n d i v i d u a l l y saving w i t h o u t r e c e i v i n g i n t e r e s t ? What i f they can take t h e i r money t o a bank and r e c e i v e i n t e r e s t on t h e i r savings?
A1 t e r n a t i v e l y , what about t h e possi b i 1 i t y of p r i v a t e l y borrowing money against i n t e r e s t ? However, a f t e r a search o f h i s t o r i c a l data ( i n c l u d i n g t h e r e s u l t s o f a ninemonth survey undertaken by a B r i t i s h A s s i s t a n t D i s t r i c t O f f i c e r i n 1933), Nwabughuogu (1984) concludes t h a t t h e s t o r y actual 1 y happened i n Ngwal and i n Ni g e r i a. The l a s t person i n t h e ROSCA c y c l e ( j = N ) o n l y b e n e f i t s from B i n t h e l a s t period. Thus, h i s / h e r t o t a l net b e n e f i t over t h e f u l l c y c l e i s given by:
Assuming N i n d i v i d u a l s who each consider o b t a i n i n g an i n d i v i s i b l e good B, t h e o p t i o n open t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s i s t o c o l l e c t i v e l y organize a ROSCA t h a t w i l
l3
The assumption o f a zero discount r a t e i s r a t h e r r e s t r i c t i v e . However, i t g r e a t l y s i m p l i f i e s t h e discussion. For t h a t reason, a zero discount r a t e w i l l be assumed i n t h e t e x t . The r e s u l t s presented below can be e a s i l y extended t o r e f l e c t a p o s i t i v e discount r a t e . This w i l l be handled i n t h e footnotes. I n the case where the . i t h individual has a positive rate of time preference, the present value of net benefit t o the j t h individual i s
where 1 + ^' R being the discount rate, R > 0. This imp1 ies that the present value of the per capita net benefit from the ROSCA i s f o r t h e N members. The second p a r t can be i n t e r p r e t e d i n several ways. The most obvious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t t h e average ROSCA member acquires B i n about h a l f t h e time i t would take him o r her t o save f o r B on h i s o r h e r own. The term also p o i n t s out t h a t approximately h a l f of t h e members o b t a i n a p o s i t i v e n e t c r e d i t through p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e ROSCA.
U n t i 1 now we have imp1 i c i t l y assumed t h a t t h e a1 t e r n a t i v e t o t h e ROSCA was t h e i n d i v i d u a l saving o f money without r e c e i v i n g i n t e r e s t income on t h e accumulated savings.
Under what c o n d i t i o n s i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a ROSCA more advantageous t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l than p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an i n t e r e s t -b e a r i n g savings account, such as provided by t h e C r e d i t Union ( a l s o present i n t h e v i l l a g e ) ?
Consider t h e case where an i n d i v i d u a l saves $C p e r p e r i o d and receives an i n t e r e s t on t h e savings account. For simp1 i c i t y , we assume t h a t i n t e r e s t i s p a i d each p e r i o d (i .e., no compound i n t e r e s t c a l c u l a t i o n s are appl i e d ) . The t o t a l net b e n e f i t o f such saving f o r an i n d i v i d u a l over N periods i s given by:I5 W e now evaluate t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e "average" ROSCA member (someone w i t h a rank J e x a c t l y i n t h e middle o f t h e cycle) w i t h t h e b e n e f i t s o f saving against an i n t e r e s t r a t e r i n t h e C r e d i t Union. One could a l s o look a t t h i s problem i n terms o f t h e ex ante b e n e f i t s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i f one assumes t h a t t h e rank an i n d i v i d u a l gets i n t h e ROSCA i s a l l o c a t e d a t random, so t h a t t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e average ROSCA member are i n f a c t t h e expected b e n e f i t o f any i n d i v i d u a l p r i o r t o t h e establishment o f t h e rank order. Choosing between t h e ROSCA and t h e C r e d i t Union, t h e i n d i v i d u a l chooses t h e ROSCA i f and o n l y i f : l5 I n t h e case o f a p o s i t i v e r a t e o f time preference, t h e net present value o f net b e n e f i t o f saving i s 1 where a = -R > 0 being t h e discount r a t e .
1 + R '
Since we know t h a t by d e f i n i t i o n c = B/N, t h i s reduces to:I6
Thus, t h e p e r i o d i c b e n e f i t s b o f t h e i n d i v i s i b l e good B need t o be s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e on savings. The i n t e r e s t r a t e on savings e s t a b l i s h e s a l o w e r bound on b .
I f b i s below t h e p e r i o d i c o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t o f
t h e fund B valued a t t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e r, t h e "average" i n d i v i d u a l w i l l decide n o t t o j o i n a ROSCA, b u t w i l l r a t h e r j o i n t h e C r e d i t Union. However, i f b > rB, i t means t h a t t h e r e a r e p o s i t i v e b e n e f i t s from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e ROSCA. I n o t h e r words, i f b > rB, t h e ROSCA i s s u p e r i o r t o p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n an i n t e r e s tb e a r i n g savings account: t h e "average" i n d i v i d u a l can be made s t r i c t l y b e t t e r o f f by j o i n i n g a ROSCA. I n t e r e s t r a t e s on savings i n formal savings i n s t i t u t i o n s i n most l e s s developed c o u n t r i e s tend t o be q u i t e low. Equation (9) 
t h u s i n d i c a t e s t h a t , on t h e average, t h e e x i s t e n c e o f i n d i v i s i b l e goods can p r o v i d e a m o t i v a t i o n f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a ROSCA. I n t h a t sense, we can i n t e r p r e t any p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a ROSCA as i n d i r e c t evidence t h a t b i s i n general above t h e o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t o f s a v i n g i n l i q u i d assets, rB. R e s u l t (9) should be i n t e rp r e t e d w i t h c a u t i o n .
It does not i m p l y t h a t every ROSCA member would always p r e f e r a ROSCA t o a savings account.
I n o t h e r words, t h e r e i s a p o t e n t i a l problem o f adverse s e l e c t i o n f o r t h e ROSCA: t h e l a s t i n d i v i d u a l s t o r e c e i v e t h e p o t have l e s s i n c e n t i v e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e scheme t h a n t h e f i r s t i n d i v i d u a l s . S o l v i n g t h i s problem wi 11 r e q u i r e r u l e s t h a t minimize asymmetry i n f o r m a t i o n and
t h e i n c e n t i v e t o " f r e e -r i d e " i n t h e ROSCA. These i s s u e s w i l l be discussed i n some d e t a i l below.
The n e x t case i s t h e l o a n a l t e r n a t i v e . What i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l can t a k e a l o a n t o o b t a i n B i n p e r i o d 1 and r e c e i v e b e n e f i t s b each period, t = 1, ...,N1 L e t us f o r m u l a t e t h e f o l l o w i n g l o a n repayment schedule: repayments i n every p e r i o d a r e equal t o a f i x e d p o r t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p a l sum (i .e., B/+N), i n t e r e s t payments a r e due s t a r t i n g i n t h e second p e r i o d and a r e c a l c u l a t e d as a f u n c t i o n l6 I n t h e case o f a p o s i t i v e d i s c o u n t r a t e , e q u a t i o n (9) becomes o f t h e o r i g i n a l l o a n amount." Thus, t o t a l repayments w i l l equal 5 + i (N -1 ) B , where i i s t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e on c r e d i t .
To e s t a b l i s h t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e a v e r a g e " i n d i v i d u a l t o p r e f e r t h e ROSCA t o t h e c o n t r a c t i n g o f a p r i v a t e loan, we need t o evaluate t h e f o l l o w i n g i n e q u a l i t y :
which, given 5 = Nc, reduces t o t h e f o l l o w i n g condition:19
l7
This i s i n f a c t t h e method employed i n t h e t r o u b l e bank. l9 I n t h e case of a p o s i t i v e discount r a t e , equation (10) becomes
' I n t h e case o f a p o s i t i v e discount r a t e (R
The existence o f t h e c r e d i t a l t e r n a t i v e thus establishes an upper bound on the benefits b o f t h e i n d i v i s i b l e good B . Only i f t h e b e n e f i t s b o f the i n d i v i s i b l e good B a r e l a r g e r than 2 i B would t h e average i n d i v i d u a l p r e f e r t o c o n t r a c t a loan against i n t e r e s t i so t h a t he o r she can immediately p r o f i t from B. The a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f the ROSCA compared w i t h a p r i v a t e c r e d i t source would e x i s t when b i s smaller than 2 i B . Given t h e f a c t t h a t i n t e r e s t r a t e s i f o r p r i v a t e moneylending can be q u i t e high, we w i l l i n t e r p r e t any p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a ROSCA as i n d i r e c t evidence t h a t b i s , i n general, l e s s than 2 i B .
It should be emphasized t h a t the r e s u l t (11) holds o n l y f o r an "average" i n d i v i d u a l . As such, (11) 
The bounds of t h e ROSCA-relevant range a r e a f u n c t i o n o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y costs of saving and t h e o p p o r t u n i t y costs o f c r e d i t . I t would seem t h a t e m p i r i c a l l y such a range can be q u i t e l a r g e i n developing economies, given t h e general l y low i n t e r e s t r a t e s on savings and the h i g h i n t e r e s t r a t e s charged by p r i v a t e money1 enders.
The marriage s t o r y i n the beginning o f t h i s s e c t i o n i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t such c o n d i t i o n s apparently e x i s t e d f o r the t h r e e brothers. The f a c t t h a t they were presumably operating i n a non-monetized economy i n which l a b o r was t h e "currency" does n o t change t h e above argument.
Conceivably, i t would s t i l l have been p o s s i b l e t o "save" l a b o r by i n v e s t i n g i t i n o t h e r p r o j e c t s , whereas i t may have a l s o been p o s s i b l e t o acquire l a b o r "on c r e d i t . "
The important p o i n t i s t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d m i croeconomi c b e n e f i t s t o t h e col 1 e c t i ve a c t i o n o f t h e brothers t h a t r e s u l t e d i n t h e c r e a t i o n o f an economic i n s t i t u t i o n , v i z . a type o f r o t a t i n g association, i n which b e n e f i t s were r o t a t e d among t h e members. The more generic forms of r o t a t i n g associations i n sub-Saharan A f r i c a are t h e we1 1 -known r o t a t i n g l a b o r association^.^^ These a l s o e x i s t e d i n the p a r t i c u l a r v i l l a g e studied and *' I n a h i s t o r i c a l study o f ROSCAs among t h e Ngwa Igbo o f Nigeria, Nwabughuogu (1984) confirms the hypothesis t h a t ROSCAs were merely a monetary v a r i a t i o n on a p r i n c i p l e t h a t had already proven i t s economic worth, i .e., t h e r o t a t i n g 1 abor associ a t i on.
were employed f o r t h e c l e a r i n g o f c o f f e e farms o r c e r t a i n weeding operavions. 21
Death aid s o c i e t i e s provide another example o f r o t a t i n g associations.
The
e r s were w i l l i n g make. I n o t h e r words, t h e c o n t r a c t was enforced i n an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g t h a t minimized t h e r i s k and t r a n s a c t i o n s c o s t s associated w i t h c o n t r a c t i n g i n an u n c e r t a i n environment (e.g., moral hazard and adverse s e l e c t i o n ) .
21
Note t h a t t h e problems o f c l e a r i n g and even o f weeding can be s e q u e n t i a l l y solved. However, one would n o t expect t o f i n d a r o t a t i n g l a b o r a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h respect t o , f o r instance, p l a n t i n g operations, which have a narrow window o f o p p o r t u n i t y .
22
I n death a i d s o c i e t i e s p a r t o f t h e fund needed t o organize t h e e l a b o r a t e f i n a l f a r e w e l l t o t h e deceased i s provided by t h e guests themsel ves. Donations are recorded so t h a t t h e hosts w i l l be able t o r e c i p r o c a t e a t a f u t u r e date, i .e., t h e occurrence o f a death i n t h e guests' fami l i e s .
23
ROSCAs may a l s o be created f o r temporary "lumpinessii problems.
For instance, i t has been reported i n Swaziland t h a t i n 1984 many ROSCAs s t a r t e d a f t e r t h e ravages o f a cyclone forced many households t o finance t h e rebui 1 d i n g o f t h e i r homes.
M I N I M I Z I N G RISK AND TRANSACTION COSTS
The marriage s t o r y pointed t o t h e need f o r an a u t h o r i t y f i g u r e who could ensure t h a t t h e money was handled f a i r l y and who had t h e power t o i n f l i c t punishment.
How e x a c t l y does t h e ROSCA enforce i t s c o n t r a c t s and, more s p e c i f i c a l l y , how does i t handle t h e r i s k o f d e f a u l t ? Or, i n t h e symbolism o f t h e marriage story, how i s t h e o l d e r brother, once married, prevented from running away w i t h h i s w i f e w i t h o u t paying h i s brothers? The person responsible f o r t h e o v e r a l l e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e ROSCA i s t h e president. He o r she has several r i s k -r e d u c i n g mechanisms a t h i s o r her disposal. For instance, r i s k can be reduced ex ante by c a r e f u l l y matching t h e average l e v e l o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s w i t h t h e repayment c a p a c i t y o f i t s membership.
Thus, members can be selected i n terms o f q u a n t
i t y and "qual i t y " -t h e l e v e l o f i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . I n t h i s respect, we observed a t r a d e -o f f between q u a n t i t y and qual i t y : t h e g r e a t e r t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n an association, t h e fewer i t s members (see Table 1). O f t h e 30 ROSCAs w i t h an average c o n t r i b u t i o n per member o f l e s s than 3,500 CFAF, 25 had more than 15 members. Membership ranged from approximately 40 i n t h e "poor" ROSCAs t o 10 i n t h e " r i c h e s t . " Careful matching i s t y p i c a l l y undertaken between t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ' s repayment c a p a c i t y and h i s / h e r rank i n t h e o r d e r o f r o t a t i o n . The amount o f c r e d i t an i n d i v i d u a l i s accorded v a r i e s d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e rank i n t h e cycle. Thus, under a system o f f i x e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s , t h e f i r s t member i n t h e c y c l e receives t h e maximum c r e d i t , w h i l e t h e l a s t member receives no c r e d i t a t a1 1 . Intermediate p o s i t i o n s cover intermediate amounts of c r e d i t . A t a zero discount r a t e , ha1 f o f t h e membership i s a n e t borrower, whereas t h e o t h e r h a l f i s a n e t saver. An order o f r o t a t i o n , then, e s s e n t i a l l y equals a l i s t o f c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y ordered loan a p p l i c a t i o n s o f v a r y i n g magnitudes. It i s up t o t h e p r e s i d e n t o f t h e ROSCA t o e s t a b l i s h an order o f r o t a t i o n t o balance t h e i n d i v i d u a l preferences against t h e o b j e c t i v e o f o v e r a l l r e d u c t i o n o f t h e r i s k o f d e f a u l t . Although some i n d i v i d u a l s p r e f e r t o be i n t h e l a t e r p o s i t i o n s given t h e i r temporal l i q u i d i t y preferences, t h e e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n s are, i n general, t h e ' b e t t e r " p o s i t i o n s .
Conversely, t h e l a t e r p o s i t i o n s would, i n general, be considered l e s s advantageous.
I f o n l y one ROSCA c y c l e would be undertakeni.e., i f t h e ROSCA was played as a one-shot game -i n d 
i v i d u a l s who ended up a t t h e end o f t h e o r d e r o f r o t a t i o n would then have an i n c e n t i v e t o drop out o f t h e ROSCA ex post, a f t e r t h e r o t a t i o n o r d e r had been established. It i s u s e f u l a t t h i s p o i n t t o draw a p a r a l l e l between t h e ROSCAis o r d e r o f r o t a t i o n and t h e establishment o f a " c r e d i t l i n e " as found on a r e g u l a r c r e d i t card. Without a c r e d i t h i s t o r y , i n d i v i d u a l s may be asked t o c o l l a t e r a l i z e t h e c r e d i t l i n e by f i r s t d e p o s i t i n g money i n a savings account. Proper use o f t h e c r e d i t card w i l l
s t a b l i s h a good c r e d i t h i s t o r y , a f t e r which t h e c o l l a t e r a l c o n s t r a i n t i s relaxed
and t h e c r e d i t l i n e g r a d u a l l y increased. Advancement i n t h e o r d e r o f r o t a t i o n o f t h e ROSCA f u n c t i o n s along t h e same l i n e s . Provided t h e i n d i v i d u a l proves t o be a good member, he o r she can move up i n t h e o r d e r and increase t h e amount o f c r e d i t obtained. I n o t h e r words, ROSCAs a r e n o t played as one-shot games; they a r e repeated games i n which n e t b e n e f i t s should be c a l c u l a t e d over more than one period.
I n ROSCAs where t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s are n o t f i x e d , i n d i v i d u a l members can d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l t h e amount o f c r e d i t accorded t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l . I n f a c t , i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r v i l l a g e under study, most ROSCAs had a system o f v a r i a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s s u b j e c t t o a c e r t a i n minimum f l o o r . Thus, under t h e r u l e o f v a r i a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s , t h e exact amount o f c r e d i t t h a t one person extends t o another person i s i n d i v i d u a l l y c o n t r o l l ed. Now each i n d i v i d u a l can eval uate s u b j e c t i v e l y another's repayment capacity, t a k i n g i n t o account p a s t experience, s t a t e d i n t e n t i o n s , and t h e l a t e s t avai 1 a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e person's c r e d i t r a t i n g . V a r i a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s a l s o allow, t o an e x t e n t t h a t v a r i e s w i t h t h e rank i n t h e cycle, t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o c o n t r o l t h e s i z e o f h i s o r her own savings.
The c r u c i a l r o l e t h a t t h e order o f r o t a t i o n plays w i t h respect t o r i s k r e d u c t i o n i s borne o u t by t h e f a c t t h a t newer members a r e general l y placed i n t h e l a s t positions.24 These p o s i t i o n s pose t h e l e a s t r i s k ; i f a person i n one o f t h e l a s t p o s i t i o n s f a i l s t o repay a f t e r having taken t h e fund, o n l y t h e few members coming a f t e r him o r h e r who have n o t y e t taken t h e fund wi 11 be a f f e c t e d . The ROSCA, then, has t h e o p t i o n o f p u t t i n g r i s k y debtors l a s t i n t h e c y c l e . The o r d e r o f r o t a t i o n i s perhaps t h e most powerful, and f l e x i b l e , management t o o l t h a t t h e p r e s i d e n t employs t o screen p o t e n t i a l borrowers.
The o r d e r o f r o t a t i o n i s n o t always established ahead o f time. I n d i v i d u a l s may bargain d u r i n g t h e c y c l e over t h e next a1 l o c a t i o n o f t h e fund. This introduces some f l e x i b i l i t y t o t h e system, as t h e rankings can be adjusted t o new information, b u t i t a l s o -introduces t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s t r a t e g i c behavior. It should be stressed t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l setup o f t h e ROSCA does n o t e a s i l y lend i t s e l f f o r insurance purposes. For instance, a considerable number o f income shocks i n t h e v i l l a g e are covariant:
a l l v i l l a g e r s a r e somewhat a f f e c t e d by these shocks a t t h e same time (e.g., droughts, i n s e c t i n f e s t a t i o n s , etc.). A d d i t i o n a l l y , i f an i n d i v i d u a l could a t a1 1 times successful l y plead and bargain f o r t h e ROSCA fund t o i n s u r e against immediate c a l a m i t i e s , moral hazard would increase. However, as we w i 11 argue below, t h i s opportunism i s e x a c t l y what t h e ROSCA t r i e s t o escape. This e x p l a i n s why an i n d i v i d u a l p l e a t o change t h e o r d e r of r o t a t i on whi 1 e a c y c l e i s a1 ready under way usual l y s t i r s heated debates. The f a c t t h a t t h e mechanism o f b i d d i n g f o r t h e fund does n o t seem t o be widespread i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e on ROSCAs i n A f r i c a may a l s o be r e l a t e d t o problems o f moral hazard and adverse s e l e c t i o n . Bidding could c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n i n which those who a r e most desperate f o r money acquire t h e fund, which may lead t o a h i g h e r
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This i s a general r u l e i n many ROSCAs i n West A f r i c a . The same mechanism was observed i n Mexico w i t h respect t o t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e tanda (Kurtz and Showman 1977) . r i s k of default f o r the i n s t i t u t i o n . In other words, riskiness would increase through sel f-selection.
The president ultimately decides on the order of rotation. The president i s typically a man or a woman with expert knowledge about the current and potential members of his o r her ROSCA. More than by business acumen, presidents a r e characterized by authority, prestige, and respect. Moreover,' presidents are almost never full-time traders who would be absent f o r long periods from the village. By v i r t u e of t h e i r social position, they are 1 i kely t o be expert judges of a man o r woman's i n t e g r i t y and economic capacity. Such information i s used t o establish accurate c r e d i t ratings of the individual members.
However, the problem of monitoring the monitor i s only partly solved by relying on the president's i n t e r e s t s and social reputation.
The ROSCA has created a simple but effective incentive mechanism t o ensure a president's dedication t o r i s k management within the ROSCA: the president always takes the last position, t h a t i s , the position in which an individual only saves and no c r e d i t i s accorded. He o r she can never escape "punishment" i f any one member defaults. Management i s d i r e c t l y eval uated on 1 oan performance. Consequently, t h e ROSCA attempts t o solve the problem by a d i r e c t application of the theory of the firm (Al chi an and Demsetz 1972). The person responsi ble f o r monitoring the ROSCA (the president) i s made the residual claimant.
The problem of "who monitors t h e monitor" i s solved.25
So f a r , we have mainly discussed ex ante r i s k reduction measures. How does the ROSCA deal with ex post risk? What i f , in s p i t e of a l l the above ex ante r i s k minimization mechanisms, somebody shows up a t the ROSCA without money?
Most commonly, a member who cannot meet the required contributions t o the ROSCA has the opportunity t o borrow from the trouble bank.^ Apart from giving i t s members access t o a short c r e d i t 1 ine independently of the ROSCA, the trouble bank col luterdizes part of the transactions of the ROSCA. Given the s i z e of the 25 Of course, t h i s leaves the president only with the benefits of personal prestige and social reputation. This reputation can, however, e a s i l y be used t o gain entry t o other ROSCAs. Moreover, we found several ROSCAs in which a f i c t i t i o u s "brother" o r "wife" of the president was p u t in the f i r s t position, compensating the president f o r the l a s t position.
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I t should be noted t h a t the ROSCA and the trouble bank are often confused with each other. These a r e two separate i n s t i t u t i o n s which, however, can easily be combined t o create a private, interest-charging banking system. For instance, in Nigeria pri vate money1 enders would organize a ROSCA or associate themselves with existing ROSCAs in order t o f a c i l i t a t e the repayment of high i n t e r e s tbearing 1 oans by debtors. Considerable f i nanci a1 wealth was accumulated by these middlemen, and t h i s system damaged the reputation of the ROSCA (see Nwabughuogu 1984) . However, i t should be noted t h a t the ROSCA i n t h i s case was merely part of a t i e d loan system exploited by financial middlemen t o enforce the s t r i c t repayment of loans.
ROSCA fund i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e l e v e l s o f s u b s c r i p t i o n s and t h e loan c e i l i n g s i n t h e t r o u b l e bank, however, i t i s obvious t h a t t h e t r o u b l e bank cannot p e r f e c t l y
c o l l a t e r a l i z e t h e ROSCA operations.
U l t i m a t e l y , t h e ROSCA may have t o face o u t r i g h t d e f a u l t by one o f i t s members, a1 though no such event took place d u r i n g t h e survey p e r i o d o f s i x months. When somebody was asked what h i s ROSCA would do t o a man unable t o c o n t r i b u t e a f t e r t a k i n g t h e fund, he said, "We w i l l take him t o Bamenda f o r execution!" A f t e r which he broke o u t i n l a u g h t e r . This i s what another informant t o l d us on t h e subject:
No s o c i e t y 1 acks those who cannot c o n t r i b u t e .
A man who f a i l s t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e njangeh, can postpone it. I f you h a v e n ' t p a i d by t h e n e x t month, people w i l l go t i r e d . O f course you can go t o t h e quarterhead o r t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l court, b u t i f t h e man simply h a s n ' t g o t t h e money, you w i l l j u s t hear t h a t , and t h a t i s a1 1. Besides, you have t o pay t h e quarterhead and t h e c o u r t : do you compensate them f o r nothing? Only a f o o l would do t h a t . I n town, people take p r o p e r t y o u t o f t h e man's house, b u t here i n t h e v i l l a g e , we d o n ' t do t h a t , we say: "ashia f o r o u r money" and f o r g e t i t . Another njangeh can t a k e t h e man, and i f he changes h i s fashion, a l l t h e b e t t e r .
Thus, w h i l e s o c i a l pressure i s c e r t a i n l y great, people do keep a sharp eye on t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s c o s t s i n v o l v e d i n e n f o r c i n g repayment. They p u t l i m i t s on how f a r they w i 11 go t o g e t t h e i r money back. Costs o f loan recovery w i l l a t some p o i n t outweigh t h e p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s .
D e f a u l t i n g comes i n phases and i n gradations. The worst d e f a u l t i s t o be unable t o c o n t r i b u t e a f t e r one has already taken t h e fund. This i s t h e f t . A m i l d e r form o f d e f a u l t i s t o be unable t o c o n t r i b u t e before one's t u r n has come. This reduces t h e s i z e o f t h e fund f o r t h e members y e t t o take t h e fund. The m a j o r i t y o f those interviewed s t a t e d t h a t they had never experienced d e f a u l t o f t h e f i r s t kind, b u t d e f a u l t o f t h e second k i n d i s more common. A d d i t i o n a l l y , d e f a u l t e r s o f t h e f i r s t k i n d r a r e l y s t a y i n d e f a u l t f o r long. Various arrangements and promi ses can postpone t h e repayment, sometimes f o r years. 28 Thus, when informants s a i d t h a t d e f a u l t i n g was r a r e o r almost absent, they meant t h a t t h e f t , i n t h e form o f i n f i n i t e l y rescheduled debt, was very r a r e e 2 ? On t h e o t h e r hand, people are n o t e x a c t l y acquiescent w i t h respect t o any k i n d o f d e f a u l t .
They see i t f o r what i t i s : an undermining o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n . D e f a u l t challenges t h e very p r i n c i p l e s on which t h e success o f t h e o p e r a t i o n i s
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Bamenda i s t h e c a p i t a l o f t h e North West Province o f Cameroon.
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Someone who had defau1,ted went t o t h e p l a n t a t i o n s i n t h e South West Province, and when he returned t e n years l a t e r , paid a l l h i s c o n t r i b u t o r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e f i n e s he had been charged, and was readmitted as a ROSCA member again .
The a t t i t u d e i n t h e v i l l a g e w i t h respect t o common t h i e v e r y can be d i s a s t r o u s f o r t h e t h i e f : i f he values h i s l i f e h i s b e s t b e t i s t o r u n t o t h e nearest p o l i c e s t a t i o n and beg t o be p u t s a f e l y behind bars.
based. If bad luck befalls one outside the ROSCA, one may plead and bargain. However, inside the ROSCA there are no excuses. This i s why the v i 1 lagers claim t h a t "not even death i s an excuse": the heir will automatically be responsible f o r repayment. Ex post, then, the opportunity f o r s t r a t e g i c behavior i s limited.
Ultimately, the unconditional contracts of the ROSCA are enforced by the threat of sanctions emanating from the wider structure of conditional contracting, which characterizes the economy within which the ROSCA i s embedded. The mechanism operating t o minimize the residual risk of default i s social ostracism and peer pressure. The costs of social ostracism within a networking economy are by definition considerable: the individual i s declared morally, socially, and economically bankrupt.
As long as the net benefits of defaulting and becoming a social outcast are s t r i c t l y 1 ess than the benefits of paying and enjoying the future benefits of the ROSCA and the wider network, ROSCA members will not choose t o default ex ante. If t h i s condition holds, the ROSCA agreements become self-enforcing even in the absence of legally binding contracts along the arguments of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Friedman 1986 ). However, in the rare case t h a t a significant downward income shock indeed rules out the possibility f o r the individual t o l i v e up t o the terms of the contract, the ROSCA has no alternative but t o accept the loss.
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
How w e l l does t h e ROSCA system perform compared w i t h o t h e r forms o f f i n a n c i a l mediation i n t h e v i l l a g e ? For instance, how important i s t h e ROSCA i n terms o f membership?
For 1979, t h e e s t i m a t i o n was t h a t , out o f a t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n o f 3,355, 95 percent o f a l l household heads were membere o f ROSCA (van den B r i n k 1980). This estimate was confirmed by t h e subchiefs o f t h e t r i b e , who gave a lower l i m i t o f 90 percent.
Thus, we can s a f e l y say t h a t a t l e a s t 90 percent o f a l l household heads was a member o f ROSCA.
Many ROSCAs had mixed male/femal e membershi ps.
Thus, women w i t h income sources comparable t o those o f male heads o f households (farming, t r a d i n g , h a n d i c r a f t s , etc.) showed a s i m i l a r p a t t e r n o f membership i n t h e ROSCA system. Moreover, most a d u l t women i n t h e v i l l a g e were members o f one o r more o f t h e many s p e c i a l i z e d t r o u b l e banks, i .e., t h e t e r m i n a t i n g f i x e d fund association^.^^ What i s t h e r e l a t i v e f i n a n c i a l importance o f t h e ROSCA system f o r t h e v i l l a g e ? The system has a t u r n o v e r o f about 74,000 d o l l a r s annually, given o u t i n approximately 650 loans. This i s a s u b s t a n t i a l amount by any standards. I f we t a k e a 200 d o l l a r s p e r c a p i t a income, which i s a generous estimate, i t would mean t h a t t h e ROSCA system m o b i l i z e s 11 percent o f v i l l a g e income. I f we add t o t h i s t h e amount o f savings accumulated i n t h e numerous t r o u b l e banks, t h e indigenous c r e d i t s e c t o r seems t o be doing a good j o b i n m o b i l i z i n g savings and extending c r e d i t . Moreover, i n t h e ROSCA, savings a r e immediately and l o c a l l y transformed i n t o c r e d i t .
I f we f e e l t h a t t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f savings i n t o c r e d i t , i.e., m o b i l i z a t i o n followed by immediate reinvestment, should be an i n d i c a t i o n o f e f f i c i e n c y , t h e ROSCA performs very w e l l .
A t t h e same time, t h e system a1 lows f o r i n d i v i d u a l mobi 1 i t y w i t h respect t o c r e d i t : w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r ROSCA, an i n d i v i d u a l can g r a d u a l l y advance i n t h e 30 I t i s sometimes argued t h a t women have d i f f e r e n t i a l access t o c r e d i t "because women g e n e r a l l y do n o t own marketable l a n d r i g h t s and, as subordinates i n t h e household, cannot e s t a b l i sh independent r e p u t a t i o n s f o r c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s " (World Bank 1990, 5) . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p r o p e r t y r i g h t s system g e n e r a l l y accords women o n l y c u l t i v a t i o n r i g h t s f o r annual crops, which do n o t e a s i l y t r a n s f o r m i n t o more permanent p r o p e r t y t i t l e s .
However, given t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s regime i n place, most men do n o t possess marketable l a n d r i g h t s e i t h e r : t h i s does n o t prevent them from e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s i n t h e ROSCA system. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e r e h a r d l y seems t o be any r e l a t i o n between a husband's c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s and t h a t o f h i s w i f e . The ROSCAs and t r o u b l e banks provide women w i t h ample o p p o r t u n i t y t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own c r e d i t r a t i n g , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h a t o f t h e i r husbands. r o t a t i onal o r d e r and increase h i s/her c r e d i t 1 i ne, matching repayment capacity w i t h rank order. M o b i l i t y i s a l s o common between ROSCAs. Thus, whereas t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between net savers and net debtors w i t h i n one c y c l e seems t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e ROSCA unequally over i t s membership, such i n e q u a l i t y i s reduced i n t h e l o n g r u n through t h e o p p o r t u n i t y given t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o advance i n t h e order o f r o t a t i o n . I n o t h e r words, t h e ROSCA forces some i n d i v i d u a l s t o save f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f others, w h i l e c o l l e c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e group. From t h e viewpoint o f t h e 'individual, s t a r t i n g o u t i n t h e l a t e r p o s i t i o n s i s an investment i n one's c r e d i t record. There t h e problem f o r t h e borrower i s e i t h e r how t o get t h e f i r s t loan o r how t o prevent asset s a l e i n t h e case o f an exogenous income shock.
I n imperfect c r e d i t markets, i n i t i a l , d i s c r e t e asset d i s t r i b u t i o n can exclude i n d i v i d u a l s s t r u c t u r a l l y from c r e d i t opportuni t i e s .
The d e f a u l t r i s k s o f p r i v a t e moneylending -a type of single-stranded market r e l a t i o n -w i t h i n t h e context o f a networking economy, a mu1 t i s t r a n d e d s e t t i n g -are probably a major reason f o r t h e development o f t h e ROSCA
i n s t i t u t i o n . Related t o t h e issue o f s u b s t i t u t i o n o f payments f o r s i d e payments w i t h i n t h e networking economy i s t h e problem o f i n f o r m a t i o n and enforcement. It i s d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i e s t o assess
where insurance stops and opportunism begins .31 M i t h respect t o p r i v a t e money1 ending, then, imperfect i n f o r m a t i o n and t r a n s a c t i o n costs seem t o be important sources o f comparative i n e f f i c i e n c y . Consequently, i n t e r e s t r a t e s outside o f economic i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as t h e ROSCA o r t h e t r o u b l e banks, are h i h i v a r i a b l e and c o n s i s t e n t l y h i g h i n many p a r t s o f A f r i c a (Miracle e t a1 . IWOY .3' 31 I n l i t i g a t i o n cases i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l courts, such dilemmas surface e x p l i c i t l y .
I t i s very d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l j u s t i c e system t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e c r e d i t r e l a t i o n between t h e two p a r t i e s from t h e o t h e r strands o f t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p .
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n problems q u i c k l y arise, and t h e f i n a l r u l i n g may leave both p a r t i e s d i s s a t i s f i e d .
However, t h e mere c i t i n g o f an i n t e r e s t r a t e o u t o f i t s context can be misleading. Many o f t h e examples of " e x o r b i t a n t " r a t e s given i n t h e 1 i t e r a t u r e are n o t i n t e r e s t r a t e s o f e x p l i c i t , unconditional c r e d i t c o n t r a c t s . They may be imp1 i e d i n t e r e s t r a t e s t h a t are p a r t o f a more general imp1 i c i t c o n t r a c t between t h e two p a r t i e s . T y p i c a l l y , business contracts are s e t up as j o i n t ventures i n which each o f t h e two p a r t i e s c o n t r i b u t e s c e r t a i n i n p u t s w h i l e p r o f i t s are shared according t o a p a r t i c u l a r formula.
Such c o n t r a c t s are e s s e n t i a l l y a type o f sharecropping contract.
The question then becomes whether t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c r e d i t o r receives p r o f i t shares i s an example o f " e x o r b i t a n t " i n t e r e s t r a t e s o r r a t h e r an example of a p a r t i c u l a r type o f r i s k -s h a r i n g arrangement which provides i n c e n t i v e mechanisms i n a context o f imperfect i n f o r m a t i o n and u n c e r t a i n t y .
The f o l l o w i n g example w i l l p o i n t t o some o f t h e impl i c a t i o n s . Before t h e harvesting o f coffee, a number o f t r a d e r s buy c o f f e e 3 i o n t h e tree." The fanner mortgages t h e standing crop i n exchange f o r c r e d i t .
To t h e farmer involved i t i s a welcome source o f cash i n t h e preharvest period. However, many farmers do n o t repay t h e i r loan, i.e., f a i l t o d e l i v e r t h e s p e c i f i e d amount o f c o f f e e a f t e r harvest. To understand t h i s a t t i t u d e and t o e x p l a i n why t r a d e r s continue t o make such loans, one has t o l o o k more c l o s e l y a t t h e wider impl i c i t c o n t r a c t and t h e nature o f t h e payments involved.
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e t r a d e r and t h e farmer i s b a s i c a l l y o f t h e generalized r e c i p r o c i t y kind. It i s a mu1 t i stranded r e l a t i o n s h i p . The t r a d e r may i n f a c t r e c e i v e payments i n t h e form o f a c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l a l l e g i a n c e o r a range o f small services, i .e., s i d e payments. Consequently, a p o i n t may be reached a t which t h e farmer considers t h e debt as repaid. N e i t h e r o f t h e two p a r t i e s may question t h i s arrangement. I n f a c t , t r a d e r s are w e l l aware o f t h e more narrow d e f a u l t r i s k s o f g e t t i n g t h e i r money back, instead o f s i d e payments. One t r a d e r estimated t h i s " d e f a u l t r i s k " as a 50 percent chance o f g e t t i n g h i s money back.
The above example c l a r i f i e s why i n d i v i d u a l s a r e h e s i t a n t t o e n t e r i n t o person-to-person, cash-credi t transactions. This suggests t h a t an induced demand f o r an a1 t e r n a t i v e economic i n s t i t u t i o n e x i s t s , which would reduce t h e t r a n s a c t i o n costs o f unconditional contracts. I n o t h e r words, a need f o r " f r e e t r a d e zones" emerges, which, i n t h e context o f t h e ROSCA, f a c i 1 i t a t e s exact r e c i p r o c i t y under t h e terms o f an unconditional c o n t r a c t . I n t h e ROSCA t h e c o n t r a c t i s unconditional: i t i s money f o r money, and t h e time frame i s e x a c t l y specified. C o n t r i b u t i o n s are made i n t o a c o l l e c t i v e fund, which i s handed over t o t h e president who can be seen as the l e g a l person representing t h e c o l l e c t i v e . He o r she then a1 l o c a t e s t h e fund t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l . I n t h e process, the enforcement problem i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y a l t e r e d : t h e c o n t r a c t i s transformed from a person-to-person c o n t r a c t embedded i n generalized r e c i p r o c i t y t o an uncondit i o n a l c o n t r a c t embedded i n the ROSCA s e t t i n g . I n o t h e r words, t h e c o l l e c t i v e "cosigns" each loan. D e f a u l t i n g by one i n d i v i d u a l now d i r e c t l y threatens t o t h e t h e
The r i s k o f expl i c i t d e f a u l t i n g induced by t h e i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t i n g o f t h e wider s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e may be considered t o o high. The p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the o t h e r p a r t y w i l l s u b s t i t u t e cash
The e x i s t i n g property regime c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s between t h e crop, i .e., produce o f 1 abor and c a p i t a l , and t h e land on which t h e crop stands. W i t h i n v i l l a g e community, t h e s a l e o f t h e land i t s e l f i s deemed i l l e g a l . Sales t o strangers, however, do i n f a c t occur, b u t t h e payments are o f t e n masked as symbolic g i f t s given t h e n o t i o n o f i l l e g a l i t y which surrounds t h e o u t r i g h t s a l e o f land. compromi se a mu1 t i tude o f o t h e r unconditional c o n t r a c t s . Inasmuch as i n d i v i d u a l s v a l ue t h e b e n e f i t s o f continued membership i n t h e c o l 1 e c t i v e more than they value t h e b e n e f i t s o f d e f a u l t i n g , t h e c o n t r a c t i s sel f -e n f o r c i n g . The i n t e r m e d i a t i o n o f t h e group reduces t h e r i s k of t h e c r e d i t t r a n s a c t i o n .
To deal w i t h t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n a l problem, one could i n t r o d u c e asset c o l l a t e r a l i n t o t h e p r i v a t e moneylending t r a n s a c t i o n . T h i s c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y increase repayment. However, a1 though t h e coffee-on-the-tree money1 ending was essenti a1 l y c o l l a t e r a l i zed c r e d i t , i t i s n o t c l e a r t h a t i t would n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t i n a more e f f i c i e n t c r e d i t scheme. Even t h e c r e d i t system o f t h e c o f f e e cooperative, i n which t h e cooperative suppl i e s preharvest c r e d i t , was characteri z e d by lower repayment r a t e s than t h e ROSCA. As w i t h t h e ROSCA, i t seems t h a t members' e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e t o t a l f u t u r e b e n e f i t s o f continued membership i s t h e c r u c i a l f a c t o r o f successful enforcement, n o t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f c o l l a t e r a l p e r se.
The C r e d i t Union, which operates i n t h e v i l l a g e , i s a formal savings and c r e d i t cooperative. F i r s t l y , how important i s t h e C r e d i t Union compared t o ROSCA i n terms o f membership? As mentioned, a t l e a s t 90 percent o f a1 1 household heads a r e a member o f ROSCA. The number o f members o f t h e C r e d i t Union i n t h e v i l l a g e was 199, which i s 30 percent o f t h e t o t a l number o f ROSCA members. I t appears t h a t t h e C r e d i t Union a t t r a c t s substanti a1 amounts o f savings because people g e n e r a l l y f e e l t h a t t h e i r savings are safe and o u t o f reach o f t h e contingent claims o f t h e l o c a l networking economy.
I n f a c t , t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c hassles members experience i n withdrawing t h e i r savings seem even t o work i n f a v o r o f t h e C r e d i t Union, because they reduce t h e 1 i q u i d i t y o f savings kept i n a c r e d i t union account.
However, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e C r e d i t Union has created f o r t h e cosigning o f loans has enabled t h e networking economy t o i n f i l t r a t e i t s operations. The f a c t t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l cannot withdraw savings, which serve as a guarantee f o r another i n d i v i d u a l ' s loan, i s o f t e n mentioned as t h e g r e a t e s t disadvantage o f t h e C r e d i t Union. Another, more s t r u c t u r a l problem of t h e C r e d i t Union i s i t s l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y t o r e i n v e s t savings l o c a l l y . The l a c k o f investment c a p a c i t y c o n s t r a i n s t h e operations o f t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n . The e q u i t y imp1 i c a t i o n s o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n problems, which are a t t h e basis o f t h i s low capacity t o p r o f i t a b l y i n v e s t funds l o c a l l y , a r e e q u a l l y important. Organizations l i k e t h e C r e d i t Union r u n t h e danger o f s u b s t i t u t i n g l a c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h what i s perceived as " l o w -r i s k " loans. This o f t e n biases c r e d i t t r a n s a c t i o n s toward t h e l o c a l e l i t e .
The ROSCA system o f t h e v i l l a g e handled 74,000 do1 l a r s annually, given o u t i n 650 loans, o r approximately 75 do1 l a r s per member. The C r e d i t Union, i n t h e same year, handled o n l y 3,800 d o l l a r s given o u t i n 37 loans, which i s about 105 d o l l a r s p e r loan.
A t t h e same time, an i n c r e a s i n g number o f loans were rescheduled loans and posed a serious danger t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n ' s l o n g term v i a b i l i t y .
What o t h e r formal c r e d i t a l t e r n a t i ves e x i s t ? Donor-i n i t i a t e d r e v o l v i ng fund c r e d i t systems i n t h e r u r a l areas o f West A f r i c a g e n e r a l l y do n o t r e v o l v e . Repayment r a t e s a r e g e n e r a l l y v e r y low. A d m i n i s t r a t o r s may g i v e a p l e t h o r a o f reasons f o r t h i s f a i 1 u r e ( i n s u f f i c i e n t r a i n f a l 1 , peasant ignorance, absence o f t h e c o o p e r a t i v e s p i r i t , l a c k o f o p e r a t i n g funds, e t c . ) , b u t these a r e probably n o t a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e general and widespread f a i l u r e o f these c r e d i t programs i n r u r a l A f r i c a . The s i n g l e most i m p o r t a n t problem o f these i n s t i t u t i o n s i s an enforcement problem. Lack o f i n c e n t i v e s f o r management might be one reason f o r t h e low repayment r a t e s usual l y associated w i t h r e v o l v i n g fund schemes, s i n c e management i s g e n e r a l l y not judged on l o a n performance. I n f a c t , most donors e x p l i c i t l y do n o t want t h e i r funds t o r e t u r n t o t h e donor l e v e l , which i s e x a c t l y why t h e r e v o l v i n g fund serves t h e i r purposes so w e l l . Whereas t h a t m i g h t be a l a u d a b l e p r i n c i p l e , i t merely s h i f t s t h e responsi b i 1 i t y f o r enforcement t o t h e r e c i p i e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n .
However, donor o r g a n i z a t i o n s r a r e l y s a n c t i o n t h e n a t i o n a l and 1 ocal bureaucracies t h a t a d m i n i s t e r t h e c r e d i t schemes on 1 oan performance. On t h e c o n t r a r y , A f r i c a n and donor a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s a1 i ke a r e r o u t i n e l y evaluated on " a b s o r p t i o n " c a p a c i t y , i .e., t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o absorb new loans. As 1 ong as p a s t performance o f loans has no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on t h e supply of new loans, t h e problem o f l a c k o f management i n c e n t i v e s w i l l probably remain. I s t h e r e l a t i o n between t h e A f r i c a n bureaucracies and t h e donor o r g a n i z a t i o n s a l s o one o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n t r a c t i ng" compromised by adverse s e l e c t i on and moral hazard? Even i f t h e answer t o t h e l a t t e r q u e s t i o n i s n o t a f f i r m a t i v e , one has t o concede t h a t n e i t h e r o f t h e a d m i n i s t e r i n g p a r t i e s (donor and n a t i o n a l ) i s evaluated on l o a n performance. From t h e extension agent,34 v i a t h e l o c a l bureaucracy and i t s t e c h n i c a l assistance, t o t h e donor admi n i s t r a t i o n , one wi 11 f i n d t h a t , a1 though nobody i s p a r t i c u l a r l y e n t h u s i a s t i c about t h e low repayment r a t e s i n formal c r e d i t schemes, no r o u t i n e s a n c t i o n i n g ( p o s i t i v e o r negative) o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e performance t i e d t o repayment o f 1 oans e x i s t s . Whether o r n o t t h e t a r g e t groups know t h a t such i s t h e case, we w i l l leave as an open question. Do low repayment r a t e s b a s i c a l l y stem from s t r a t e g i c behavior on t h e i r p a r t ? A much more promi s i n g s t r a t e g y f o r formal c r e d i t schemes would i n v o l v e some form o f c o l l e c t i v e l i a b i l i t y , as i n t h e ROSCA system. The automatic e x c l u s i o n o f a c o l l e c t i v e from new loans i f one o f i t s members f a i l s t o repay would i n v o l v e , however, a c o o r d i n a t i o n problem between competing formal c r e d i t schemes. Uncoordinated c o m p e t i t i o n between donors u n f o r t u n a t e l y does e x i s t .
I f t h a t p r o b l em were solved, enforcement o f sanctions woul d probably be evaluated as c r e d i b l e by t h e t a r g e t group.
Another t y p e o f c r e d i t scheme i s centered around a " t e c h n i c a l package." It faces t h e same i n f o r m a t i o n and enforcement problems as t h e r e v o l v i n g fund schemes b u t adds t o t h i s t h e o b l i g a t o r y adoption o f a supposedly p r o f i t a b l e package o f i n p u t s ( f o r instance, animal t r a c t i o n , f e r t i 1 i z e r s , p e s t i c i d e s , e t c . ) . Many o f
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The e x t e n s i o n agents face t h e added problem o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f two p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g r o l e s . He o r she has t o wear t h e c o n f l i c t i n g h a t s o f propagator and e n f o r c e r o f a loan. fund i s t h e i n d i v i d u a l "1 i q u i d " : he o r she can now b e t t e r a n t i c i p a t e t h e use o f those l i q u i d assets. Moreover, w h i l e i n t h e process o f saving, t h e i n d i v i d u a l has a s o c i a l l y acceptable defense a g a i n s t c l a i m s o f o t h e r people. Such temporal 1 i q u i d i t y arguments a r e i 11 u s t r a t e d by remarks such as : "Peopl e cannot bore you by asking f o r money," o r "Your r e l a t i v e s can ask you f o r money o n l y a t t h e r i g h t time." I n a k i n s h i p economy, d i r e c t r e l a t i v e s a r e a prominent source o f c o n t i n g e n t c l a i m s and s t r a t e g i c bargaining. In-1 aws, f o r instance, a r e n o t o r i o u s claimants. I f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n -l a w s were members o f t h e same ROSCA, t h e y would, f i r s t , " have access t o accurate i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s f i n a n c i a l wealth and, second, t h e y would know e x a c t l y when t o make t h e i r claims. One q u e s t i o n asked o f ROSCA members was whether t h e y had any r e l a t i v e s i n t h e same ROSCA. T h e i r answers provided some evidence o f temporal 1 i q u i d i t y preferences: t h e h i g h e r t h e average l e v e l o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n a ROSCA, t h e fewer t h e r e l a t i v e s .
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F i n a l l y , i t i s o f i n t e r e s t t o examine t h e i n f l u e n c e o f wealth on t h e re1 a t i ve importance o f general i zed r e c i p r o c i t y versus balanced r e c i p r o c i t y . I n general, one may expect t h a t insurance motives and wealth accumulation are substitutes: t h e demand f o r insurance decreases as p r i v a t e wealth increases, ceteris paribus. To t h e e x t e n t t h a t o n l y generalized r e c i p r o c i t y can s a t i s f y insurance needs, t h e importance o f general i zed (bal anced) r e c i p r o c i t y woul d tend t o decrease (increase) w i t h wealth accumulation. I n o t h e r words, t h e w e a l t h i e r one i s , t h e l e s s one needs t o r e l y on c o n t i n g e n t c l a i m s from t h e k i n s h i p system, and t h e more one may use balanced r e c i p r o c i t y . There i s some e m p i r i c a l evidence supporting t h i s hypothesis: c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e ROSCA increased considerably between 1971 and 1980, a p e r i o d over which general wealth i n t h e v i l l a g e s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased.
Spearman's rank c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t f o r t h e observed r e l a t i o n was 0.8214, s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e 5-percent l e v e l .
